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Abstract
The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and
communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and
hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case that some players
cooperatively decide on their joint action in order to maximize the coalition’s total utility.
This is by modeled by Coalitional Congestion Games. Typical settings include truck
drivers who work for the same shipping company, or routers that belong to the same ISP.
The formation of coalitions will typically imply that the resulting coalitional congestion
game will no longer posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In this paper we provide conditions
under which such games are potential games and posses a pure Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Congestion games, introduced by Rosenthal [5], form a very natural model for studying
many real-life strategic settings: Traffic problems, load balancing, routing, network plan-
ning, facility locations and more. In a congestion game players must choose some subset
of resources from a given set of resources (e.g., a subset of edges leading from the Source
to the Target on a graph). The congestion of a resource is a function of the number of
players choosing it and each player seeks to minimize his total congestion accross all cho-
sen resources. In many modeling instances players and the decision making entity have
been thought of as one and the same. However, in a variety of settings this may not be
the case.
Consider, for example, a traffic routing game where each driver chooses his route in
order to minimize his travel time, while accounting for congestion along the route caused
by other drivers. Now, in many cases drivers are actually employees in shipping firms,
and in fact it is in the interest of the shipping firm to minimize the total travel time
of its fleet. Similarly, routers in a communication network participate in a congestion
game. However, as various routers may belong to the same ISP we are again in a setting
where coalitions naturally form. This motivated Fotakis et al. [2] and Hayrapetyan
et al. [3] to introduce the notion of Coalitional Congestion Games (CCG). In a CCG
we think about the coalitions as players and each coalition maximizes its total utility.
The coalitional congestion game inherits its structure from the original game, once the
coalitions of players from the original congestion games (now, becoming the players of the
coalitional congestion game) have been identified.
The most notable property of congestion games is that they have posses pure Nash equilib-
rium. This has been shown by Rosenthal in [5]. Later, Monderer and Shapley [4] formally
introduce potential games and show the equivalence of these two classes. The fact that
potential games posses a pure Nash equilibrium is straightforward. Unfortunately, the
statement that a CCG is a potential game or that it possesses a pure Nash equilibrium
is generally false. In this paper we investigate conditions under which this statement is
true. We focus on a subset of congestion games called simple congestion games, where
each player is restricted to choose a single resource.
Our main contributions are:
1. Whenever each coalition contains at most two players the CCG induced from a
simple congestion game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1).
2. If some coalition contains three players, then there may not exist a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium (Example 1).
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3. If a the congestion game is not simple then there may not exist a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium (Example 2); and
4. Suppose there exists at least one singleton coalition and at least one coalition com-
posed of two players, then a coalitional congestion game induced from a simple
congestion game is a potential game if and only if cost functions are linear (Theo-
rem 2).
Our results extend and complement the results in Fotakis et al. [2] and Hayrapetyan et al.
[3]. For example, Fotakis et al. [2] show that if the resource cost functions are linear then
the coalitional congestion game is a potential game. We show that, with some additional
mild conditions on the partition structure, this is also a necessary condition. Hayrapetyan
[3] shows that if the underlying congestion game is simple and costs are weakly convex
then the game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium. We demonstrate additional settings
where this holds.
Section 2 provides a model of a coalitional congestions games, section 3 discusses the
conditions for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in such games and section 4
discusses the conditions for the existence of a potential function. All proofs are relegated
to an appendix.
2 Model
Let G = {N, S, U} be a non-cooperative game in strategic form. Let C = {C1, . . . , Cnc}
be a Partition of N into nc nonempty sets. Hence: ∪n
c
k=1Ck = N and Ck ∩ Cl = ∅ ∀k 6=
l ∈ [1, . . . nc].
The game G and the partition C form a Coalitional Non-Cooperative (CNC) Game GC =
{NC , Sc, U c} defined as follows:
• NC is the set of agents which are the elements of C.
• The strategy space is Sc = {Sck}k∈C where S
c
k = ×i∈CkSi.
Note that ×Sk = ×k∈C ×i∈Ck Sk,i is isomorphic to S = ×
n
i=1Si, since we only changed the
order of the coordinates. Thus, we can look on sc as a vector in S.
• The utility function is defined as follows: ∀sc ∈ Sc U ck(s
c) =
∑
i∈Ck
Ui(s
c) and
U c = {U ck}k∈C .
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In the context of GC , G is the Underlying Game and a player in G is referred to as a sub
agent. As always, a Pure Nash Equilibrium of the game GC is a strategy profile s ∈ SC
such that ∀k ∈ NC , U ck(s) ≥ U
c
k(s−k, tk) ∀tk ∈ S
c
k. NE(G
C) the (possibly empty) set of
Pure Nash equilibrium strategy profiles in GC .
A congestion game is a game G = {N,R,Σ, P} where N is the finite set agents, R is the
finite set resources, P = {Pr}r∈R are the resource costs functions, where Pr : [1, . . . , n]→
R and Σ = ×i∈NΣi, where Σi ⊆ 2
R, is i’s strategy space. Agent i selects si ∈ Σi and pays∑
r∈si
Pr(c(s)r), where c(s)r =
∑
j∈N I{r∈sj} is the number of agents who select r in s. In
utility terms, the utility of agent i is Ui(s) = −
∑
r∈si
Pr(c(s)r). If Σi = R ∀i ∈ N then
G = {N,R,Σ, P} is called a Simple Congestion Game.
We will assume that the Pr functions are non-negative and increasing (Pr(1) can be zero).
Fix a Simple Congestion Game or Coalitional Congestion Game (CCG)G with R resources
and n (sub-)agents. A congestion vector is an element of NR whose elements sum up to n.
A Simple Congestion Game (CCG) G and a strategy profile s induce a congestion vector
c(s): {c(s)r}r∈R.
A strategy profile s of a Coalitional Congestion Game GC induces a private congestion
vector for each of the agents in GC . Such vector for agent k will be ck: ck(sk)r = |{i ∈
Ck : sk,i = r}| which is an element if N
R whose elements sum up to |Ck|.
Let X be a subset of the strategy profiles space. We denote c(X) as the corresponding
set of congestion vectors: ∀X ⊆ S c(X) = {c(s) s.t : s ∈ X}
3 CCG and Pure Nash Equilibria
The following preliminary result asserts that if the a Nash equilibrium the underlying
game is composed of strategies such that all sub-agents of any agent choose different
resources, then it is also an equilibrium of the coalitional game.
Proposition 1 Let G be a Simple Congestion Game , C a partition of N and GC be the
induced CCG. Let s be a strategy profile of GC where sk,i 6= sk,j ∀k ∈ N
C , ∀i, j ∈ Ck. If
c(s) ∈ c(NE(G)) then s ∈ NE(GC).
This is key to proving our central result about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
CCGs:
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Theorem 1 Let G be a Simple Congestion Game , C a partition where the largest element
is of size 2, and GC a CCG with the underlying game G and the partition C. Then
NE(GC) 6= ∅. That is, if the largest coalition is a Pair, a Pure Nash equilibrium always
exists.
Does this existence result extend to other partition forms, where the maximal element
has more than two sub-agents? The following example demonstrates that this is not true
in general:
Example 1 Consider a game with two identical resources A and B and four sub agents,
with the following payment functions:
Resource / Agents #: 1 2 3 4
A: 0 12 16 18
B: 0 12 16 18
When C = [{1, 2, 3}, {4}] the matrix form of the resulting 2-player CCG is:
GC A B
A,A,A -54, -18 -48, 0
A,A,B -32, -16 -36, -12
A,B,B -36, -12 -32, -16
B,B,B -48, 0 -54, -18
Whereas the underlying Simple Congestion Game has a pure Nash equilibrium this CCG
has none. To verify this note for the compound agent (made up of 3 sub-agents) the
strategies AAA and BBB are dominated. Following their deletion the remaining game is
one of matching pennies and hence has no Pure Nash equilibrium .
Can the result of Theorem 1 be extended to CCGs with small coalition size, but with an
underlying congestion game that is not simple? Again, the answer is negative:
Example 2 Let G be a Congestion Game with three identical resources and three agents.
Each agent of G chooses two of the three resources. The cost of each resource is P (n) =
6− 6
n
.
Let C = [{1, 2}{3}], and GC is the CCG with underlying game G and partition C. After
omitting identical strategies due to sub agents symmetry GC looks as follows:
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GC AB AC BC
AB,AB -16,-8 -14,8 -14,-4
AC,AC -14,-4 -16,4 -14,-4
BC,BC -14,-4 -14,-4 -16,-8
AB,AC -11,-7 -11,-7 -12,-6
AB,BC -11,-7 -12,-6 -11,-7
AC,BC -12,-6 -11,-7 -11,-7
Note that compound agent’s strategies (AB,AB), (AC,AC) and (BC,BC) are dominated.
Note that the remaining game has no pure Nash equilibrium.
4 CCG and Potential
An Exact Potential is a function P : S → R satisfying:
P(s)− P(s−i, ti) = Ui(s)− Ui(s−i, ti) (1)
∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Si, ∀s ∈ S1 × S2 . . .× Sn
Games with a potential function are called Potential Games. It is well known that poten-
tial games have a pure Nash equilibrium (see Monderer and Shapley [4]). In particular
Congestion Games are potential games. Fotakis et al [2] prove that a CCG, where the
cost functions of the resources of the underlying game are linear, is a potential game.
Removing the linearity assumption is problematic. In fact, even in the case of a CCG with
a maximal coalition of size 2, which guarantees the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium
(Theorem 1), the existence of Exact Potential is not guaranteed. In the following example
we show that the existence of a potential function implies linearity of the cost functions:
Example 3 Consider a congestion games with 2 resources, A and B, with costs a1, a2, a3
and b1, b2, b3, correspondingly. Assume there are 3 players and set the coalition structure
to C = [{1, 2}{3}]. This induces the following two player CCG, given in matrix form:
GC A B
A,A 2a3, a3 2a2, b1
A,B a2 + b1, a2 a1 + b2, b2
B,B 2b2, a1 2b3, b3
Assume this game has an exact potential with the following values:
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GC A B
A,A P1 P2
A,B P3 P4
B,B P5 P6
From the definition of exact potential the following must hold (see, in addition, Theorem
2.9. in Monderer and Shapley [4]):
(a2 + b1 − 2a3) + (a3 − b1) + (2a2 − a1 − b2) + (b2 − a2) =
(P3 − P1) + (P1 − P2) + (P2 − P4) + (P4 − P3) = 0.
Similarly:
a2 + b1 − 2b2 + a1 − b3 + 2b3 − a1 − b2 + b2 − a2 = 0
2a3 − 2b2 + a1 − b3 + 2b3 − 2a2 + b1 − a3 = 0.
Manipulating these equalities leads to:
2a2 = a1 + a3
2b2 = b1 + b3,
which implies that the cost functions are linear.
Using this example we can now prove our final result:
Theorem 2 Let G be a Simple Congestion Game and let C be a partition that has at
least one element of size 1 and at least one element of size 2. Let GC be a CCG with the
underlying game G and partition C. GC will posses an Exact Potential iff the CCG is
linear.
Proof:
Sufficiency - This has been obtained Fotakis et al. [2] (Theorem 6).
Necessity - Recall that example 3 provides a 3 player congestion game and a coalition
structure that yields a CCG for which linear cost function are necessary for the existence
of a potential. The reason that the the linearity extends beyond the example to all
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situations implied in the theorem is that for any general CCG we can fix the strategy
for all but 2 agents, of which one has 2 sub agents and one has a single sub agent. We
can now look at the induced 2 player game. If the original game was a potential game
so must be the induced game. The example then implies linearity in the induced game.
However, as we can arbitrarily fix the strategy for all but the relevant 3 sub agents the
result follows. 
A Appendix - Omitted Proofs
We begin with the definition of an auxiliary game. Let G be a Simple Congestion Game
and let C be a partition. The Restricted Coalitional Congestion Game, denoted GC ,
is a CCG where coalitions are restricted strategies such that distinct sub-agents choose
distinct resources. More formally:
Definition 1 Let G be a Simple Congestion Game and let C be a partition. The Re-
stricted Coalitional Congestion Game, denoted GC, is the game GC = {N c, Sc, U c}, where
N c and U c are as before and Sc = {Sck}k∈C where S
c
k = {×i∈CkSk,i : sk,i 6= sk,j ∀i, j ∈ Ck}.
The following result about pure Nash equilibria in restricted coalitional congestion games
will be useful for proving our main result:
Lemma A.1 Let G be a Simple Congestion Game and C a partition of N . Let GC be a
Restricted CCG with the underlying game G and the partition C. Let s be a strategy profile
of GC (where sk,i 6= sk,j ∀k ∈ N
C , ∀i, j ∈ Ck). If c(s) ∈ c(NE(G))⇒ s ∈ NE(GC)
Proof:
For two congestion vectors u, v, let d(u, v) =
∑
r∈R |vr−ur|
2
, denote the distance between
these two vectors.
Let s be a strategy profile satisfying the condition of the lemma, let k be an arbitrary
agent in the game GC and denote by s−k be the strategy profile of all players except
k. We denote by BR(s−k) the set of k’s best reply strategies to s−k. Assume , by way
of contradiction, that sk 6∈ BR(s−k) and let tk ∈ BR(s−k) be a best reply to s−k which
corresponding congestion vector has a minimal distance to c(sk). Namely, d(c(tk), c(sk)) ≤
d(c(t′k), c(sk)) ∀t
′
k ∈ BR(s−k).
In GC each agent selects each resource at most once. As ck(tk) 6= ck(sk) this implies
that there are two resources, say r and x, such that: (ck(tk)r, ck(tk)x) = (1, 0) and
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(ck(sk)r, ck(sk)x) = (0, 1) and, in addition, that c(s)r = c(tk, s−k)r − 1 and c(s)x =
c(tk, s−k)x + 1.
Let i be the sub-agent of k that chooses r in tk but chooses a resource different than r in
sk. Let t
′
k be a strategy for agent k, derived from tk by moving sub agent i from r to x.
This results in c(t′k, s−k)x = c(s)x and c(t
′
k, s−k)r = c(s)r. By assumption, c(s) ∈ NE(G).
Therefore Px(c(s)x) ≤ Pr(c(s)r + 1) and so:
Px(c(t
′
k, s−k)x) = Px(c(s)x) ≤ Pr(c(s)r + 1) = Pr(c(tk, s−k)r) (2)
Thus, the contribution of sub agent i to agent k’s payment in (t′k, s−k) is less or equal its
contribution to k’s payment in (tk, s−k). As the only change in k’s strategy between tk
and t′k is i’s choice, we conclude that k’s payment in (t
′
k, s−k) is less or equal its payment in
(tk, s−k), and so t
′
k ∈ BR(s−k). However, by construction d(c(t
′
k), c(sk)) ≤ d(c(tk), c(sk)),
contradicting the way tk was chosen. ✷.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let s be a profile as described in the Proposition. Let tk be the best reply strategy for
agent k to s−k. We show that ck(tk)r ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ N
C and ∀r ∈ R.
Assume this is not true and that some resource r, tk,i = tk,j = r. Since ck(sk)r ≤ 1
we know that c(s−k, tk)r > c(s)r. Therefore there must exist some resource x such that
c(s−k, tk)x < c(s)x.
Let t′k be a strategy profile derived from tk by moving sub agent i from r to x. In the
strategy profile (s−k, t
′
k) agent i pays Px(c(s−k, t
′
k)x). By construction:
c(s−k, t
′
k)x = c(s−k, tk)x + 1 ≤ c(s)x (3)
From Equation 3 and the fact that c(s) ∈ NE(G) we get that:
Px(c(s−k, t
′
k)x) = Px(c(s−k, tk)x + 1) ≤ Px(c(sx)x) ≤ Pr(c(s)r + 1) (4)
Using monotonicity of the cost functions and the fact that c(s)r + 1 ≤ c(s−k, tk)r we get:
Pr(c(s)r + 1) ≤ Pr(c(s−k, tk)r) (5)
Combining Equations 4 and 5 we get that
Px(c(s−k, t
′
k)x) ≤ Pr(c(s−k, tk)r) (6)
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We will now show that k is better off in the strategy profile (s−k, t
′
k) than in (s−k, tk),
thus contradicting the fact that tk is a best response to s−k. We do this but analyzing
each of k’s sub-agents:
• Sub agent i pays in (s−k, t
′
k), where he chose x, no more than than in (s−k, tk), where
he chose r (equation 6).
• From definition of x, ck(tk)x < ck(sk)x. Since ck(sk)x = 1 and ck(sk)x > ck(tk)x, we
get that ck(tk)x = 0. Thus, apart from agent i no other sub agent of k chose x in tk.
• Sub agent j, who selects r both in (s−k, t
′
k) and (s−k, tk), pays strictly less in (s−k, t
′
k)
than in (s−k, tk), because c(s−k, t
′
k)r < c(s−k, tk)r. This inequality holds for any other
sub agent of k who chose r in tk
• All sub agents who choose a resource in the set R \ {r, x} pay the same in (s−k, tk)
and (s−k, t
′
k).
To conclude, agent k pays strictly less in (s−k, t
′
k) than in (s−k, tk). This contradicts the
fact that tk is a best reply to s−k. Therefore, any best reply of k to s−k must be such that
all the sub-agents choose different resources.
Thus, agent k’s best reply strategy to s−k is a strategy that is allowed also in GC . We
couple this observation with the observation that s is a Nash equilibrium of GC (follows
from Lemma A.1) and the fact that k is arbitrary to conclude that s ∈ NE(GC).
QED
Proof of Theorem 1:
Let s be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of G
Case 1 - Assume that c(s)r ≤ |N
C | for all resources r ∈ R. In this case we can re-
arrange the players over the resources so that the result will be a strategy profile with the
same congestion vector, and furthermore, for any k ∈ NC its two sub agents, i, j, choose
different resources. The resulting vector is also inNE(G) and complies with the conditions
in Proposition 1. Therefore that proposition suggests that s is a Nash equilibrium of GC .
Case 2 - Let us denote by r the resource with the highest congestion in s and assume
c(s)r > |N
C |. We argue that without loss of generality (by rearranging the players) s has
the following two properties: (a) if agent k has its 2 sub agents on the same resource then
it must be the case that the corresponding resource is r, that is, ∀k ∈ NC c(sk)r′ > 1
implies r′ = r; and (b) all agents have at least one sub-agent choose r.
Note some properties of the strategy tuple s:
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1. Let k be an agent with a single sub agent. Then this sub agent must be on r and it
has no profitable deviation.
2. Let k be an agent with a two sub agents, i and j. Assume i is on r and j is on some
r′ 6= r. Moving a single subagent cannot be profitable.
3. Let k be an agent with two sub-agents, i and j. Assume i is on r and j is on some
r′ 6= r. Moving both sub agents simultaneously cannot be profitable as at least one
of these moves makes k worse off, while the other cannot improve k payoff.
4. Let k be an agent with two sub-agents, i and j, both on r. Moving both sub agents
cannot be profitable.
Thus, if s is not a NE of Gc, the only profitable deviation possible is for an agent k with
two sub-agents, i and j, both on r, to move one sub-agent, say j to another resource, say
r′. Furthermore, let us assume that this is the most profitable deviation for k. That is
Pr′(c(sr′) + 1) ≤ Pr′′(c(sr′′) + 1) for all r
′′ 6= r. We denote the resulting strategy profile
by s′. Note the properties of s′:
1. All agents with a single sub-agent choose the resource r.
2. All agents with two sub agents, have at lease one sub agent in r.
3. The payment of all sub agents in r is lower compared with s, while the payment of
all subagents in R \ {r} is at least as large compared with the payment in s.
4. Any agent with two sub agents, one on r and one on some r′′ 6= r pays (weakly) less
than what k paid in s
Assume s′ is not a Nash equilibrium, then there must be some profitable deviation. What
are the possible profitable deviations?
1. Let k′ be an agent with a single sub agent. Then this sub agent must be on r and
it has no profitable deviation. Recall that the payment of k is s′ is lower than the
payment of k′ is s.
2. Let k′ be an agent with a two sub agents, i and j. Assume i is on r and j is
on some r′ 6= r. Moving i cannot be profitable for the same argument as above.
Moving j to another resource in R \ {r} cannot be profitable, so the only profitable
deviation might be moving j back to r. However, this would result k′ paying the
same payment that k paid in s, which by construction of s′ is higher than what k
pays in s′. Implying that k′ had a profitable deviation in s, thus contradicting what
we already know.
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3. Let k be an agent with two sub-agents, i and j. Assume i is on r and j is on some
r′ 6= r. Moving both sub agents simultaneously cannot be profitable as at least one
of these moves makes k worse off, while the other cannot improve k payoff.
4. Let k be an agent with two sub-agents, i and j, both on r. Moving both sub agents
cannot be profitable.
Once again, the only profitable deviation possible is for an agent k′ with two sub-agents
both on r, to move one sub-agent. The resulting strategy profile s′′, once more, only allows
for profitable deviations of the same form. Namely, for an agent k′ with two sub-agents
both on r, to move one sub-agent. We continue iteratively in the same manner. As the
process is bounded by the number of agents selecting r with both sub agents in s, it must
end in finitely many steps. The final strategy vector has no profitable deviations and is,
therefore, a Nash equilibrium of the game.
QED
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